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Book Review Forum: Dynamics among Nations: The Evolution
of Legitimacy and Development in Modern States by Hilton
Root
In Dynamics among Nations, Hilton Root looks at the waning influence of the West’s policy of
liberal internationalism in the face of rising demand for alternative forms of development, centered
on China. Peter Trubowitz finds the book’s argument to be a compelling one, but also argues
that it may underestimate the continuing ‘demand’ for liberal internationalism, and downplay fears
in Asia of American abandonment in the face of China’s increasing economic and geo-political
power.
This is the first in USAPP’s new series of Book Review Forums. Click here to to read the
response of the book’s author, Hilton Root. 
Dynamics among Nations: The Evolution of Legitimacy and
Development in Modern States. Hilton Root. MIT Press. November 2013.
Find this book:  
Hilton Root has written a valuable book on the dynamics of global politics and
international change.  While many will want to read the book for its thoughtful
contributions to the study of institutional change and economic development,
it also speaks directly to the current debate over the future of liberal
internationalism, what Root dubs “the foreign policy of the West.” As he sees
it, liberal internationalism is on the wane.  Much of the book seeks to explain
why, and this is what I want to focus on here.
For Root, the defining feature of our time is the global diffusion of economic
power.  Patterns of worldwide trade are shifting.  The global South is
becoming more important to the world economy; the global North, less so. 
This shift, Root argues, is not shaking out according to the predictions of
Western models of economic development.  Instead of a top-down, North-
South process of emulation and inculcation of liberal norms, the global economy is fragmenting
and decentering. Manufacturing and trade are dispersing and recombining into South-to-South
networks that have little interest or need for the values and beliefs the West is promulgating.  The
problem, as Root sees it, is that what liberal internationalism offers as a pathway to modernity is no
longer very attractive to states rapidly moving up the international ladder.
Root is not the only scholar to identify this decentering process, or to point to a world in the not too distant future
when there will be, as he puts it, “No Captain at the Helm.” Charles Kupchan’s book, No One’s World, makes a
similar prediction.  So does Ian Bremer’s Every Nation for Itself.  But Root reaches that conclusion from a different
starting point. Drawing on complexity theory, he sketches an evolutionary process that helps explain why liberal
internationalism has lost some of its luster and why going forward, the liberal West won’t be the focal point of
global trade. In his account, the problem is not that Western values and norms are in shortly supply – the West
isn’t caput. It’s that the demand for those values is rapidly diminishing as alternative development models (most
notably, Beijing’s authoritarian capitalism) are gaining traction in a world where Western and especially American
power is weakening.
It’s a compelling argument that will be of interest to international relations scholars as well as students of
Comparative Politics.  Yet for all its strengths, it rests on a conception of liberal internationalism that I think leads
Root to downplay and underestimate the continuing “demand” for liberal internationalism.
Root equates liberal internationalism with ideas such as economic openness, international cooperation, and
nation building.  Indeed, he grounds liberal internationalism in modernization theory.  Its key tenets are the widely
held beliefs that economic growth and democracy are mutually reinforcing, and that increased trade will lead to
sociopolitical convergence and greater global cooperation.
That this is part of the liberal internationalist “gestalt” is clear.  But in America’s hands, liberal internationalism has
always been more than promoting a particular path to the “promised land” of modernity.  It’s been as much about
guaranteeing security in a world in which economic wealth often whets a state’s geopolitical appetites. During the
Cold War, states that were willing to subscribe to the American modernization agenda of economic openness and
free trade also enjoyed the benefits of America’s military umbrella that provided security and protection from states
that did not. Economic partnership and military power were coupled. This gave many developing states a double
incentive to buy into America’s international agenda.  Many did and many are likely to continue doing so, for
security if not economic reasons.
Why?  Because the very process of economic diffusion that Hilton describes will give them incentives to do so. 
Root is right when he says that South-South trade is becoming more important to the global economy.  But the
vast bulk of that South-South trade is centered in one region of the world – Asia.  Yes, the Middle East and Africa
are part of the story; Latin America too.  But intra-regional Asian trade accounts for 40 percent of all South-South
trade today.  This matters because if there’s one country that offers the most plausible alternative to Hilton’s
version of liberal internationalism, it’s China.  The problem is that China is also the country that poses the single
greatest threat to its neighbors in “the hood.”  In short, the Middle Kingdom attracts and repels at the same time.
If Root’s analysis is right, we should expect to see less demand for liberal internationalism in Asia.  But is that
what we are seeing?  I don’t think so, at least not when one factors the security dimension into liberal
internationalism.  Indeed, the great fear in Asian capitals today is not that the U.S. will try to impose its values and
beliefs on the region, but rather that it will not make good on its commitments to the region’s security.  American
abandonment, not U.S. interference, is what worries Asian leaders today.
What I’m suggesting here is that Asia’s leaders are not only asking the micro-foundational question that Hilton
poses at the end of the book. He asks: “If they [the nations of East Asia] can partner with China for trade, why risk
signing on to a program [America’s liberal internationalism] that might reduce their personal power and diminish
their longevity in office?” (p. 231).  That’s a fair question, but for Asian leaders there is a second micro-
foundational question, which is only now coming into focus.  It goes something like this: “How can I guarantee my
state’s autonomy and my own hold on power if the United States is unwilling to discourage China from converting
its economic wealth into geopolitical power?
As anyone who follows political developments inside the United States knows, this is not an idle concern. It’s real. 
Public support for liberal internationalism is weakening.  Opinion polls show that Americans are increasingly weary
of paying the “overhead costs” of liberal internationalism at a time of sluggish growth and increasing inequality. 
There is some irony in this, because if there’s one thing that America and the West might do to counter the
growing South-South economic axis that Root describes, it’s expanding trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic trade.  But
both are currently on hold, and the reason is not an absence of support for liberal internationalism abroad.  The
problem is a shortage of support in the United States itself.
From this perspective, the real problem facing liberal internationalism is one of supply, not demand.  The question
is not whether others will see advantage in working within the Western rule-based system, but whether the chief
guarantor of that system will have the political will to continue underwriting that order.  This is why we see so much
anxiety in Asia about political developments in the United States. If the U.S. won’t provide security, who will?
So does this mean that Root is wrong when he argues that liberal internationalism is no longer the only game in
town?  No: he’s right about that.  Power is diffusing and this creates political space for alternative models of
governance and growth. But that same process fuels international insecurity.  This is easiest to see in Asia, but it’s
not inconceivable that we could see something similar in other regions, perhaps in Latin America as Brazil gains
power and influence in the region.  To my mind, the real analytic challenge identified by Dynamics among Nations
is this: how can we manage and contain the regional insecurity dynamics that a world of diffusing global power is
certain to fuel?
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